Reviewed by Bill Breakstone, November 30, 2010
Master storyteller John Grisham has done it again. There is a reason why this novelist brings out one bestseller after another—he finds a timely topic, then weaves a fast-paced narrative that grabs the reader’s attention immediately and won’t let go.
“The Confession” is about the death penalty, the inequities of the criminal justice system, and political corruption. It illustrates how minority defendants are discriminated against by investigators, prosecutors, judges and juries, and that such discrimination is systemic. No need here to describe the plot—let the readers enjoy the tale themselves without previews.
However, it is worth noting that this past Sunday, The New York Times ran an article by Adam Liptak about the death penalty, in particular Supreme Court Justice John Paul Stevens’ decision to reverse his position on it. Stevens has written an article that appears in the current issue of The New York Review of Books in which he came to the conclusion “that personnel changes on the court, coupled with ‘regrettable judicial activism, had created a system of capital punishment that is shot through with racism, skewed toward conviction, infected with politics and tinged with hysteria.”
Liptak writes: “The death penalty in the United States has never been anything but an abomination — a grotesque, uncivilized, overwhelmingly racist affront to the very idea of justice. Police and prosecutorial misconduct have been rampant, with evidence of innocence deliberately withheld from defendants being prominent among the abuses. Juries have systematically been shaped — rigged — to heighten the chances of conviction, and thus imposition of the ultimate punishment. Prosecutors and judges in death penalty cases have been overwhelmingly white and male and their behavior has often — not always, but shockingly often — been unfair, bigoted and cruel. Innocents have undoubtedly been executed. Executions have been upheld in cases in which defense lawyers slept through crucial proceedings. Alcoholic, drug-addicted and incompetent lawyers — as well as lawyers who had been suspended or otherwise disciplined for misconduct — have been assigned to indigent defendants. And it has always been the case that the death penalty machinery is fired up far more often when the victims are white.”
Justice Stevens was not alone in his opinions about the death penalty. Liptak continues: “Justice Harry Blackmun was 85 years old and near the end of his tenure on the Supreme Court when he declared in 1994 that he could no longer support the imposition of the death penalty. ‘The problem,’ he said, ‘is that the inevitability of factual, legal and moral error gives us a system that we know must wrongly kill some defendants, a system that fails to deliver the fair, consistent and reliable sentences of death required by the Constitution.’ Justice Blackmun vowed that he would no longer participate in a system ‘fraught with arbitrariness, discrimination, caprice and mistake.’ In 1990, Justice Thurgood Marshall asserted: ‘When in Gregg v. Georgia the Supreme Court gave its seal of approval to capital punishment, this endorsement was premised on the promise that capital punishment would be administered with fairness and justice. Instead, the promise has become a cruel and empty mockery.’ Justices Blackmun and Marshall are gone, but the death penalty is still with us. It is still an abomination.”
With this background in mind, read Grisham’s book. You will not only find it thoroughly enjoyable, but highly informative on a public issue that truly needs attention.
Tuesday, November 30, 2010
Sunday, November 28, 2010
MUSIC REVIEW--THE NEW YORK PHILHARMONIC & RAFAEL FRUHBECH de BURGOS--NOVEMBER 26-27, 2010
Reviewed by Bill Breakstone, November 28, 2010
The Spanish conductor Rafael Fruhbeck de Burgos has been a busy man in America this year. He filled in for James Levine at Tanglewood over the summer for several engagements, has assignments with the orchestras of Philadelphia, Boston, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Montreal, Cincinnati and Houston later in the season, and this week took over the podium at The Philharmonic for four varied programs. On Friday night, he conducted works by Glinka, Tchaikovsky, Debussy and Stravinsky.
Glinka’s Overture to Ruslan and Ludmilla opened the program, a rousing allegro, always a crowd-pleaser. The tempo was a bit on the fast side, but the orchestra followed attentively, it’s playing superb. Next, the brilliant Greek violin virtuoso Leonidas Kavakos joined the forces for a performance on Tchaikovsky’s Violin Concerto in D Major. Kavakos is as fine a fiddler performing today. His pacing in the opening Allegro Moderato was exactly that, beautifully accompanied by the conductor and orchestra. Intensity and fire picked up in the cadenza, and all brought the movement to a rousing conclusion. The lyrical second movement Canzonetta was lovingly rendered, and the fireworks returned at a much brisker tempo in the Finale. The audience broke into rapturous applause, and was rewarded by a sober, beautifully played rendition of a movement from Eugene Ysaye’s Bach-inspired Sonata for Solo Violin.
After the interval, Fruhbeck de Burgos turned to two orchestral showpieces, the first Claude Debussy’s three Nocturnes. These expositions of orchestral timbre and color were magnificently performed, assisted by the Women of the New York Choral Artists. The work was a favorite of Leonard Bernstein, but this performance was as sumptuous as I have ever heard. The program concluded with the Suite from The Firebird by Stravinsky. The pacing was just right, the orchestral playing magnificent, and the Philharmonic never sounded better. What a treasure this orchestra is, and how lucky is New York to have such fabulous ensembles as this and The Met Orchestra on its doorstep.
The Saturday matinee was one of the annual Philharmonic programs that features first chair instrumentalists performing a chamber music work. Avery Fisher Hall may not be the perfect setting for this genre, but what a pleasure to hear such consummate artists as Glenn Dichterow, Michelle Kim, Cynthia Phelps, Rebecca Young and Carter Brey play Mozart’s G Minor Quintet, K. 516, as fine a chamber work as he ever conceived. And what obvious pleasure these performers had in playing this masterpiece. It is one of Mozart’s compositions that begs the question “what if?” The first three somber and chromatic movements and the adagio introduction to the finale are all in the minor mode, and are precursors to Beethoven’s more mature chamber writings; only in the Allegro finale does the composer switch to a major tonality.
After intermission, the rather full orchestra reassembled on stage for Haydn’s Military Symphony, No. 100 in G Major. Fruhbeck de Burgos led a brisk-paced, elegant reading of this “London Symphony,” enjoying every minute of this joy of symphonic creation. The concert concluded with the Tchaikovsky Concerto. Quite a workout for both the orchestra and conductor. We New Yorkers need to see more of this fine musician in the future.
The Spanish conductor Rafael Fruhbeck de Burgos has been a busy man in America this year. He filled in for James Levine at Tanglewood over the summer for several engagements, has assignments with the orchestras of Philadelphia, Boston, Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, St. Louis, Montreal, Cincinnati and Houston later in the season, and this week took over the podium at The Philharmonic for four varied programs. On Friday night, he conducted works by Glinka, Tchaikovsky, Debussy and Stravinsky.
Glinka’s Overture to Ruslan and Ludmilla opened the program, a rousing allegro, always a crowd-pleaser. The tempo was a bit on the fast side, but the orchestra followed attentively, it’s playing superb. Next, the brilliant Greek violin virtuoso Leonidas Kavakos joined the forces for a performance on Tchaikovsky’s Violin Concerto in D Major. Kavakos is as fine a fiddler performing today. His pacing in the opening Allegro Moderato was exactly that, beautifully accompanied by the conductor and orchestra. Intensity and fire picked up in the cadenza, and all brought the movement to a rousing conclusion. The lyrical second movement Canzonetta was lovingly rendered, and the fireworks returned at a much brisker tempo in the Finale. The audience broke into rapturous applause, and was rewarded by a sober, beautifully played rendition of a movement from Eugene Ysaye’s Bach-inspired Sonata for Solo Violin.
After the interval, Fruhbeck de Burgos turned to two orchestral showpieces, the first Claude Debussy’s three Nocturnes. These expositions of orchestral timbre and color were magnificently performed, assisted by the Women of the New York Choral Artists. The work was a favorite of Leonard Bernstein, but this performance was as sumptuous as I have ever heard. The program concluded with the Suite from The Firebird by Stravinsky. The pacing was just right, the orchestral playing magnificent, and the Philharmonic never sounded better. What a treasure this orchestra is, and how lucky is New York to have such fabulous ensembles as this and The Met Orchestra on its doorstep.
The Saturday matinee was one of the annual Philharmonic programs that features first chair instrumentalists performing a chamber music work. Avery Fisher Hall may not be the perfect setting for this genre, but what a pleasure to hear such consummate artists as Glenn Dichterow, Michelle Kim, Cynthia Phelps, Rebecca Young and Carter Brey play Mozart’s G Minor Quintet, K. 516, as fine a chamber work as he ever conceived. And what obvious pleasure these performers had in playing this masterpiece. It is one of Mozart’s compositions that begs the question “what if?” The first three somber and chromatic movements and the adagio introduction to the finale are all in the minor mode, and are precursors to Beethoven’s more mature chamber writings; only in the Allegro finale does the composer switch to a major tonality.
After intermission, the rather full orchestra reassembled on stage for Haydn’s Military Symphony, No. 100 in G Major. Fruhbeck de Burgos led a brisk-paced, elegant reading of this “London Symphony,” enjoying every minute of this joy of symphonic creation. The concert concluded with the Tchaikovsky Concerto. Quite a workout for both the orchestra and conductor. We New Yorkers need to see more of this fine musician in the future.
BOOK REVIEW--"OBAMA'S WAR" by BOB WOODWARD
Reviewed by Bill Breakstone, November 28, 2010
When Bob Woodward’s latest book, “Obama’s Wars,” was released for publication some six weeks ago, it was lavishly promoted with personal appearances by the author on just about every single talk show, and also accorded notoriety by some striking revelations of a personal nature of aides within both White House and Pentagon circles. I put off reading the volume as it seemed the critics and talking heads had more than amply covered its contents. I was wrong!
“Obama’s Wars” is a fascinatingly detailed account of the new president’s assumption of the Afghanistan Crisis, starting during his briefings by the Bush White House and Pentagon staff once he became a presidential candidate, through his election, inauguration, and the first 18 months of his presidency. It may be Woodward’s finest effort, though many will find the complexity of the decision-making process to be staggering. But if you’re a foreign policy buff, or just want to really understand why the Afghan War is such a frustrating challenge for policy makers, this book is for you.
On the day Obama was elected, there were 150,000 American troops in Iraq, and 38,000 in Afghanistan. One of Obama’s campaign pledges was to turn the focus from Iraq and deal with where the Islamic terrorists, both the Taliban and al Qaeda, were active, meaning Afghanistan, AND Pakistan.
The policy headache started on November 26, 2008, and it would become a migraine of the worst order. On that date, President Bush met with Gen. Douglas Lute, the war czar, for one of his last National Security Council Meetings. Lute had conducted a thorough review of the Afghan War, and the results were grim. We were headed toward failure, plain and simple. He pinpointed three reasons: (1) Afghan governance was totally inadequate; (2) the opium trade was out of control, with its resulting corruption of public officials; (3) Pakistan was harboring the Taliban, and their intelligence agency was supporting them—without Pakistan’s determination to act as our ally in rooting out al Qaeda and the Taliban, the chance of success in Afghanistan would be futile.
Thus began a 13-month policy review by the new administration and their military staff at the Pentagon and “in country.” Obama was determined to “get it right,” no matter what it would take. He proceeded in a deliberate fashion, listened to the advice of his Pentagon chiefs and his national security team, sorted through the options presented, changed his commanders in the field, fought the military tooth-in-nail, and finally, in December of 2009, endorsed a plan which was signed off on by everyone, then presented in a speech at West Point.
An additional 30,000 troops, four combat brigades would be authorized, but only three sent immediately. The option of deploying the fourth brigade would be made in December of 2010. As an added caveat to the Pentagon, it was agreed that should circumstances warrant it, and additional 10%, or 3,000 additional troops, may also be deployed. Troop presence would build until July of 2011, when a drawdown would begin, depending upon the situation on the ground.
Reports coming back from Afghanistan during the winter of 2009—2010 were discouraging, to say the least. The plan was not working. The Taliban were operating freely in almost all areas of the country. Troop training was inadequate; not even one company of American soldiers could turn over responsibility to the Afghan Army and Police. The Afghan government did not have the support of the population. Pakistan spoke highly of a joint effort, but refused to act in any meaningful way. Changes had to be made.
Things came to a head in May and June of 20010. Intelligence Director Admiral Dennis Blair was fired on May 20th. The ground commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was fired and replaced by Gen. David Petraeus on June 23rd.; the final manpower shoe dropped on October 8, 2010, when National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones (Ret.) announced his resignation, to be replaced by Thomas E. Donilon.
Woodward completed his book in late July of 2010, and since that time, the Afghan Crisis continues to be in a state of flux. The December Review is due any week now, and it does not appear that conditions on the ground have improved in any meaningful way. Will the fourth combat brigade be deployed? Will the timetable for beginning the troop drawdown be extended? Will Special Forces and CIA forces be deployed on the ground in Pakistan? That will never be announced publically; it will be a totally covert operation.
Woodward doesn’t draw any conclusions; he and his staff just state the facts and leave future policy to the decision makers. But the reader can surmise certain options:
(1) Afghanistan is unwinnable! Al Qaeda is not there. They are in Pakistan. The Kabul government is a fraud, led by an unstable, manic-depressive who is on and off medications and subject to wild mood swings, states of paranoia, corrupt, and without the support of his people. Why did the Russians finally give up? They realized it was hopeless. Do we need to follow their example?
(2) The focus must be where al Qaeda is, and the Taliban, and that is in Pakistan. Action must be taken there. Woodward reports that such a possibility has indeed been discussed among high administration officials, but no decision has been forthcoming. The option is to tell the Pakistanis that either they will root out the extremists or we will.
(3) We have witnessed in the past 18 months numerous attempts by terrorists to inflict severe damage on our homeland. Thus far, we have dodged the bullet through a combination of intelligence gathering and sheer luck. But it’s like playing Russian roulette. Sooner or later, a bullet will be in the chamber. When the catastrophe happens, options will be taken out of the administration’s hands.
(4) Additional efforts should be directed to other al Qaeda training centers and bases being harbored elsewhere in the world, noticeably in Yemen and Somalia.
Woodward begins “Obama’s Wars” with a personal note of thanks to two of his staffers. These are his words:
“I had two of the most exceptional people assist me full-time on the reporting, writing, editing and thinking about this book: Josh Boak, a 2001 cum laude graduate of Princeton and later of the Columbia University master’s program in journalism. . . . Josh immersed himself in all the details and nuances of the Afghanistan War, the Obama administration and Washington politics. He became part of my brain—the better part. . . . there would be no book without him—not even close; Evelyn M. Duffy, who worked with me on “The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006—2008, continued on this project. Thank God. At age 25, she is a wizard at everything.”
Thanks to Woodward and his young staffers, “Obama’s War” is a classic analysis of national decision-making and the awful conflict that will no doubt tear this Nation apart for the foreseeable future.
When Bob Woodward’s latest book, “Obama’s Wars,” was released for publication some six weeks ago, it was lavishly promoted with personal appearances by the author on just about every single talk show, and also accorded notoriety by some striking revelations of a personal nature of aides within both White House and Pentagon circles. I put off reading the volume as it seemed the critics and talking heads had more than amply covered its contents. I was wrong!
“Obama’s Wars” is a fascinatingly detailed account of the new president’s assumption of the Afghanistan Crisis, starting during his briefings by the Bush White House and Pentagon staff once he became a presidential candidate, through his election, inauguration, and the first 18 months of his presidency. It may be Woodward’s finest effort, though many will find the complexity of the decision-making process to be staggering. But if you’re a foreign policy buff, or just want to really understand why the Afghan War is such a frustrating challenge for policy makers, this book is for you.
On the day Obama was elected, there were 150,000 American troops in Iraq, and 38,000 in Afghanistan. One of Obama’s campaign pledges was to turn the focus from Iraq and deal with where the Islamic terrorists, both the Taliban and al Qaeda, were active, meaning Afghanistan, AND Pakistan.
The policy headache started on November 26, 2008, and it would become a migraine of the worst order. On that date, President Bush met with Gen. Douglas Lute, the war czar, for one of his last National Security Council Meetings. Lute had conducted a thorough review of the Afghan War, and the results were grim. We were headed toward failure, plain and simple. He pinpointed three reasons: (1) Afghan governance was totally inadequate; (2) the opium trade was out of control, with its resulting corruption of public officials; (3) Pakistan was harboring the Taliban, and their intelligence agency was supporting them—without Pakistan’s determination to act as our ally in rooting out al Qaeda and the Taliban, the chance of success in Afghanistan would be futile.
Thus began a 13-month policy review by the new administration and their military staff at the Pentagon and “in country.” Obama was determined to “get it right,” no matter what it would take. He proceeded in a deliberate fashion, listened to the advice of his Pentagon chiefs and his national security team, sorted through the options presented, changed his commanders in the field, fought the military tooth-in-nail, and finally, in December of 2009, endorsed a plan which was signed off on by everyone, then presented in a speech at West Point.
An additional 30,000 troops, four combat brigades would be authorized, but only three sent immediately. The option of deploying the fourth brigade would be made in December of 2010. As an added caveat to the Pentagon, it was agreed that should circumstances warrant it, and additional 10%, or 3,000 additional troops, may also be deployed. Troop presence would build until July of 2011, when a drawdown would begin, depending upon the situation on the ground.
Reports coming back from Afghanistan during the winter of 2009—2010 were discouraging, to say the least. The plan was not working. The Taliban were operating freely in almost all areas of the country. Troop training was inadequate; not even one company of American soldiers could turn over responsibility to the Afghan Army and Police. The Afghan government did not have the support of the population. Pakistan spoke highly of a joint effort, but refused to act in any meaningful way. Changes had to be made.
Things came to a head in May and June of 20010. Intelligence Director Admiral Dennis Blair was fired on May 20th. The ground commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was fired and replaced by Gen. David Petraeus on June 23rd.; the final manpower shoe dropped on October 8, 2010, when National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones (Ret.) announced his resignation, to be replaced by Thomas E. Donilon.
Woodward completed his book in late July of 2010, and since that time, the Afghan Crisis continues to be in a state of flux. The December Review is due any week now, and it does not appear that conditions on the ground have improved in any meaningful way. Will the fourth combat brigade be deployed? Will the timetable for beginning the troop drawdown be extended? Will Special Forces and CIA forces be deployed on the ground in Pakistan? That will never be announced publically; it will be a totally covert operation.
Woodward doesn’t draw any conclusions; he and his staff just state the facts and leave future policy to the decision makers. But the reader can surmise certain options:
(1) Afghanistan is unwinnable! Al Qaeda is not there. They are in Pakistan. The Kabul government is a fraud, led by an unstable, manic-depressive who is on and off medications and subject to wild mood swings, states of paranoia, corrupt, and without the support of his people. Why did the Russians finally give up? They realized it was hopeless. Do we need to follow their example?
(2) The focus must be where al Qaeda is, and the Taliban, and that is in Pakistan. Action must be taken there. Woodward reports that such a possibility has indeed been discussed among high administration officials, but no decision has been forthcoming. The option is to tell the Pakistanis that either they will root out the extremists or we will.
(3) We have witnessed in the past 18 months numerous attempts by terrorists to inflict severe damage on our homeland. Thus far, we have dodged the bullet through a combination of intelligence gathering and sheer luck. But it’s like playing Russian roulette. Sooner or later, a bullet will be in the chamber. When the catastrophe happens, options will be taken out of the administration’s hands.
(4) Additional efforts should be directed to other al Qaeda training centers and bases being harbored elsewhere in the world, noticeably in Yemen and Somalia.
Woodward begins “Obama’s Wars” with a personal note of thanks to two of his staffers. These are his words:
“I had two of the most exceptional people assist me full-time on the reporting, writing, editing and thinking about this book: Josh Boak, a 2001 cum laude graduate of Princeton and later of the Columbia University master’s program in journalism. . . . Josh immersed himself in all the details and nuances of the Afghanistan War, the Obama administration and Washington politics. He became part of my brain—the better part. . . . there would be no book without him—not even close; Evelyn M. Duffy, who worked with me on “The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006—2008, continued on this project. Thank God. At age 25, she is a wizard at everything.”
Thanks to Woodward and his young staffers, “Obama’s War” is a classic analysis of national decision-making and the awful conflict that will no doubt tear this Nation apart for the foreseeable future.
Wednesday, November 24, 2010
MUSIC NOTES--BELA BARTOK'S MUSIC FOR STRINGS, PERCUSSION AND CELESTA
by Bill Breakstone, November 24, 2010
Hans Nathan was my first professor of music history in college. He was a Hungarian, born and raised in Budapest. We studied music from the Renaissance, the Baroque, the Classical and the Romantic Periods in our first year of classes, the fall of 1959 and the winter and spring of 1960. The emphasis was on Bach, Mozart and Beethoven. When several students asked him to touch on Rachmaninoff’s works, Dr. Nathan addressed them briefly, but offered this advice: “What you want to concentrate on among modern composers is Bela Bartok. He was the finest composer of this century. Study his music closely and in depth.”
I followed the Professor’s advice from that moment on, and have never regretted it. Last night, as I was reading Bob Woodward’s latest book, I felt the need to listen to Bartok once again. The same year I was attending classes with Dr. Nathan, Fritz Reiner, who was a student of Bartok, made a recording with his Chicago Symphony Orchestra that became one of the greatest discs of all time. It contained performances of Bartok’s Concerto for Orchestra; Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta; and the Hungarian Sketches. I chose the middle work, and was again swept away by the music’s originality, tonality, dissonances, instrumentation and passion.
Bartok composed the work in 1936 when he was at the height of his compositional career, that period between 1934 and 1940. It is in four movements, of which Grove’s writes: “The piece shows great originality at all levels of its construction and seamlessly integrates the broadest range of Bartok’s folk-music and art-music sources.” Musicologists describe the opening movement as a fugue; I prefer to call it a passacaglia or a chromatic fantasy. Whatever, it is a masterpiece, an example of what I refer to as the building blocks of musical composition, how composers have stood on their predecessor’s shoulders through the ages and created new music that can stand on its own, even though it owes respect and pays tribute to its heredity. The thematic content of this movement permeates the following three, eventually reappearing in its original form before the orchestral tutti that powerfully closes the work.
The Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta is not as popular with audiences as Bartok’s Concerto for Orchestra, but is a favorite among conservatory students and professors of performance technique. The orchestration is astoundingly original, the use of the piano and celesta both magical and fascinating. And Reiner’s performance has never been matched over the 50 years since the recording was made. And as luck would have it, the RCA A&R men never did a better job of orchestral sound reproduction.
Thus, I will offer the same advice to music lovers unfamiliar with this masterpiece that Dr. Nathan offered me all those years ago: “Study this piece and all of Bartok’s well.” He was indeed the greatest composer of the 20th Century.
Hans Nathan was my first professor of music history in college. He was a Hungarian, born and raised in Budapest. We studied music from the Renaissance, the Baroque, the Classical and the Romantic Periods in our first year of classes, the fall of 1959 and the winter and spring of 1960. The emphasis was on Bach, Mozart and Beethoven. When several students asked him to touch on Rachmaninoff’s works, Dr. Nathan addressed them briefly, but offered this advice: “What you want to concentrate on among modern composers is Bela Bartok. He was the finest composer of this century. Study his music closely and in depth.”
I followed the Professor’s advice from that moment on, and have never regretted it. Last night, as I was reading Bob Woodward’s latest book, I felt the need to listen to Bartok once again. The same year I was attending classes with Dr. Nathan, Fritz Reiner, who was a student of Bartok, made a recording with his Chicago Symphony Orchestra that became one of the greatest discs of all time. It contained performances of Bartok’s Concerto for Orchestra; Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta; and the Hungarian Sketches. I chose the middle work, and was again swept away by the music’s originality, tonality, dissonances, instrumentation and passion.
Bartok composed the work in 1936 when he was at the height of his compositional career, that period between 1934 and 1940. It is in four movements, of which Grove’s writes: “The piece shows great originality at all levels of its construction and seamlessly integrates the broadest range of Bartok’s folk-music and art-music sources.” Musicologists describe the opening movement as a fugue; I prefer to call it a passacaglia or a chromatic fantasy. Whatever, it is a masterpiece, an example of what I refer to as the building blocks of musical composition, how composers have stood on their predecessor’s shoulders through the ages and created new music that can stand on its own, even though it owes respect and pays tribute to its heredity. The thematic content of this movement permeates the following three, eventually reappearing in its original form before the orchestral tutti that powerfully closes the work.
The Music for Strings, Percussion and Celesta is not as popular with audiences as Bartok’s Concerto for Orchestra, but is a favorite among conservatory students and professors of performance technique. The orchestration is astoundingly original, the use of the piano and celesta both magical and fascinating. And Reiner’s performance has never been matched over the 50 years since the recording was made. And as luck would have it, the RCA A&R men never did a better job of orchestral sound reproduction.
Thus, I will offer the same advice to music lovers unfamiliar with this masterpiece that Dr. Nathan offered me all those years ago: “Study this piece and all of Bartok’s well.” He was indeed the greatest composer of the 20th Century.
Friday, November 19, 2010
BOOK REVIEW--"WITHOUT HESITATION" by General (Ret.) Hugh Shelton
Reviewed by Bill Breakstone, November 20, 2010
One bright, beautiful spring day in 1991, I left my office in Manhattan and took the subway three stops downtown to Chambers Street to view the homecoming parade of our troops returning from Desert Storm. Out in front of one of the brigades of the 101st Airborne Division was a tall, gangly, bespectacled Brig. General leading his troops past the reviewing stand. He was so tall he stood out like a sore thumb, and couldn’t help from being a center of attention. That General was Hugh Shelton.
Henry Hugh Shelton served as fourteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States from 1997 to 2001. “Without Hesitation” is his autobiography, and it is a dandy. At 530-odd pages, it is a big book, and is filled with voluminous details, tales of personal adventures, and stories of heroism and dedication to the Service and the Country.
Shelton was born on January 2, 1942 in the town of Tarboro, North Carolina. He was raised just outside the tiny enclave of Speed. He attended North Carolina State University where he majored in textiles; he also enrolled in the Army ROTC program, becoming a commissioned officer upon graduation. He served two years as an Army Ranger, one of which was in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. He had committed to work for a large textile company after his Army commitment was fulfilled, but found himself missing his Army commitments and comrades. After a year in textiles, it was back to the Army and a life-long career that would take him to the very top of the Nation’s military leadership.
Shelton was a natural born leader and manager of men and material assets. He led from the front, was candid and honest with superiors and subordinates, and always stood up for his troops. He never shied from making a controversial decision, even if it was “against the grain”, and his judgments were always based on a firm knowledge of the facts behind any situation. And Shelton was not the kind of general you wanted to get mad. He picked few fights throughout his life, but when he did, he was tough as nails.
What one takes away from reading this autobiography is: a sense of what leadership is all about; how huge an undertaking is the management of a military organization, be it a battalion (600 soldiers), brigade (5,000 soldiers), a division (18,000 soldiers), a corps (@75,000 soldiers), or the entire military (over 2 million soldiers).
The book contains fascinating accounts of Operation Agile Provider (Haiti), Operation Desert Fox (Iraq), the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the invasion of Afghanistan following the horrendous events of 9/11.
Shelton also provides an in-depth study of the management styles of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, and of his Secretaries of Defense, William Cohen under Clinton and Donald Rumsfeld under Bush. He is scathing in his portrayal of Rumsfeld and his associates Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Cambone and Doug Feith. But he saves his best for Senator John McCain.
Here is a brief look at the awful time he had with Team Bush:
“There are two kinds of relationships between a Chairman and a Secretary of Defense. There was the kind I had with Bill Cohen, where we worked together and protected each other’s flanks. And there was the McNamara-Rumsfeld model, based upon deception, deceit, working political agendas, and trying to get the Joint Chiefs to support an action that might not be the right thing to do for the Country but would work well for the President from a political standpoint.”
Shelton’s relationship with President Bush was another matter, one of mutual respect if not total admiration. His analysis of the former President’s performance matches that of many others—loyalty is on the one hand is an admirable virtue, but an unwavering loyalty to subordinates at the highest levels who make boneheaded decisions that damage the interests of the Nation is not the type of leadership that best serves the Country.
I owe another debt of gratitude to Charlie Rose for bringing this book to my attention. I caught the end of his interview with Shelton early one morning when watching his show on the Bloomberg Network. Thanks again Charlie for another brilliant recommendation.
One bright, beautiful spring day in 1991, I left my office in Manhattan and took the subway three stops downtown to Chambers Street to view the homecoming parade of our troops returning from Desert Storm. Out in front of one of the brigades of the 101st Airborne Division was a tall, gangly, bespectacled Brig. General leading his troops past the reviewing stand. He was so tall he stood out like a sore thumb, and couldn’t help from being a center of attention. That General was Hugh Shelton.
Henry Hugh Shelton served as fourteenth Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the United States from 1997 to 2001. “Without Hesitation” is his autobiography, and it is a dandy. At 530-odd pages, it is a big book, and is filled with voluminous details, tales of personal adventures, and stories of heroism and dedication to the Service and the Country.
Shelton was born on January 2, 1942 in the town of Tarboro, North Carolina. He was raised just outside the tiny enclave of Speed. He attended North Carolina State University where he majored in textiles; he also enrolled in the Army ROTC program, becoming a commissioned officer upon graduation. He served two years as an Army Ranger, one of which was in the Central Highlands of Vietnam. He had committed to work for a large textile company after his Army commitment was fulfilled, but found himself missing his Army commitments and comrades. After a year in textiles, it was back to the Army and a life-long career that would take him to the very top of the Nation’s military leadership.
Shelton was a natural born leader and manager of men and material assets. He led from the front, was candid and honest with superiors and subordinates, and always stood up for his troops. He never shied from making a controversial decision, even if it was “against the grain”, and his judgments were always based on a firm knowledge of the facts behind any situation. And Shelton was not the kind of general you wanted to get mad. He picked few fights throughout his life, but when he did, he was tough as nails.
What one takes away from reading this autobiography is: a sense of what leadership is all about; how huge an undertaking is the management of a military organization, be it a battalion (600 soldiers), brigade (5,000 soldiers), a division (18,000 soldiers), a corps (@75,000 soldiers), or the entire military (over 2 million soldiers).
The book contains fascinating accounts of Operation Agile Provider (Haiti), Operation Desert Fox (Iraq), the wars in Bosnia and Kosovo, and the invasion of Afghanistan following the horrendous events of 9/11.
Shelton also provides an in-depth study of the management styles of Presidents Clinton and George W. Bush, and of his Secretaries of Defense, William Cohen under Clinton and Donald Rumsfeld under Bush. He is scathing in his portrayal of Rumsfeld and his associates Paul Wolfowitz, Stephen Cambone and Doug Feith. But he saves his best for Senator John McCain.
Here is a brief look at the awful time he had with Team Bush:
“There are two kinds of relationships between a Chairman and a Secretary of Defense. There was the kind I had with Bill Cohen, where we worked together and protected each other’s flanks. And there was the McNamara-Rumsfeld model, based upon deception, deceit, working political agendas, and trying to get the Joint Chiefs to support an action that might not be the right thing to do for the Country but would work well for the President from a political standpoint.”
Shelton’s relationship with President Bush was another matter, one of mutual respect if not total admiration. His analysis of the former President’s performance matches that of many others—loyalty is on the one hand is an admirable virtue, but an unwavering loyalty to subordinates at the highest levels who make boneheaded decisions that damage the interests of the Nation is not the type of leadership that best serves the Country.
I owe another debt of gratitude to Charlie Rose for bringing this book to my attention. I caught the end of his interview with Shelton early one morning when watching his show on the Bloomberg Network. Thanks again Charlie for another brilliant recommendation.
Tuesday, November 16, 2010
BOOK REVIEW--Our Kind of Traitor by John le Carre
Reviewed by Bill Breakstone, November 16, 2010
The English author John le Carre has written 22 novels, the first being Call for the Dead, published in 1961. I have read and enjoyed every one. He is one of those authors I just can’t get enough of.
His latest work is Our Kind of Hero, and has been critically acclaimed as one of his best. I don’t know if I would go that far, but it is a tremendously good read.
The story opens at a Caribbean island resort, where Oxford professor Perry Makepiece is vacationing with his long-time companion Gail Perkins. Perry is a top-flight amateur tennis player, and is introduced by the resort’s tennis pro to a mysterious Russian national named “Dima,” also a splendid player, but no match for Makepiece, who “sandbags” the two sets in a typically and gentlemanly British show of fairness and good sportsmanship. This immediately impresses Dima, and the two and Gail become intimate friends. A bit too intimate, it turns out.
For Dima is the world’s most powerful money launderer, and is near the top of the Russian mafia. However, there is big trouble in Moscow’s underworld, and Dima wants out, for both himself and his family. He confides all this with Perry, and asks the Oxford Don if he is in reality a spy. When Perry truthfully says “absolutely not,” Dima asks if he has any contacts within MI6. Dima has some state secrets that should very much interest them, and he proceeds to fill Perry in. Perry immediately realizes that Dima’s secrets are powerful stuff indeed, in that he places several highly positioned British diplomats right in the middle of the Russian Mafia’s influence. I won’t divulge any more of the storyline than that; let the reader take it from there.
The author’s characterizations are brilliantly realized, and his reserved, very English method of storytelling has always fascinated this reader, and does so here once again. Le Carre is nearing his 70th birthday, but has lost none of his narrative powers. His fans are many; then again there are readers who have never taken a liking to his style. Count me among the former. May he write many more tales such as this one, and enjoy decades more of good health and literary happiness.
The English author John le Carre has written 22 novels, the first being Call for the Dead, published in 1961. I have read and enjoyed every one. He is one of those authors I just can’t get enough of.
His latest work is Our Kind of Hero, and has been critically acclaimed as one of his best. I don’t know if I would go that far, but it is a tremendously good read.
The story opens at a Caribbean island resort, where Oxford professor Perry Makepiece is vacationing with his long-time companion Gail Perkins. Perry is a top-flight amateur tennis player, and is introduced by the resort’s tennis pro to a mysterious Russian national named “Dima,” also a splendid player, but no match for Makepiece, who “sandbags” the two sets in a typically and gentlemanly British show of fairness and good sportsmanship. This immediately impresses Dima, and the two and Gail become intimate friends. A bit too intimate, it turns out.
For Dima is the world’s most powerful money launderer, and is near the top of the Russian mafia. However, there is big trouble in Moscow’s underworld, and Dima wants out, for both himself and his family. He confides all this with Perry, and asks the Oxford Don if he is in reality a spy. When Perry truthfully says “absolutely not,” Dima asks if he has any contacts within MI6. Dima has some state secrets that should very much interest them, and he proceeds to fill Perry in. Perry immediately realizes that Dima’s secrets are powerful stuff indeed, in that he places several highly positioned British diplomats right in the middle of the Russian Mafia’s influence. I won’t divulge any more of the storyline than that; let the reader take it from there.
The author’s characterizations are brilliantly realized, and his reserved, very English method of storytelling has always fascinated this reader, and does so here once again. Le Carre is nearing his 70th birthday, but has lost none of his narrative powers. His fans are many; then again there are readers who have never taken a liking to his style. Count me among the former. May he write many more tales such as this one, and enjoy decades more of good health and literary happiness.
Monday, November 15, 2010
MUSIC REVIEW--THE KUSS QUARTET AT CARAMOOR
November 14, 2010
Reviewed by Bill Breakstone
The Berlin-based Kuss Quartet appeared at Caramoor on Sunday afternoon, November 14th. I had not previously attended a concert by this ensemble, nor had I even heard of the group except when I read the promotional material mailed me by Caramoor. The four instrumentalists hail from different countries in Europe: first violinist Jana Kuss and second violinist Oliver Willie reside in Berlin; violist William Coleman hails from England; and cellist Mikayel Hakhnazaryan is from Albania.
The program offered one of Haydn’s Op. 20 quartets, and two mature quartets by Mozart, the B-Flat Major “Hunt Quartet,” K. 458 and the D Major 1st Prussian Quartet, K. 575. This was a delectable trio of quartets, to be sure.
Haydn’s set of six Op. 20 quartets were composed around 1770; the exact dates on many of Haydn’s works are hard to pinpoint. They are not as often performed as his more mature quartets of Op. 71, 74, 76 and 77. But they are nonetheless fascinating examples of one of the great quartet composers of all ages, indeed the inventor of the form. They date from the composer’s Sturm und Drang period, and established the four-movement format that Haydn and Mozart would use from then on; Beethoven, too, used the four-movement outline up until his late quartets. The outer movements were generally of moderate to fast pace; the inner two movements consisted of an adagio and a minuet. Haydn’s biographer Tovey wrote of the C Major, No. 2 that “it a new degree of cyclic integration with its luxuriantly scored opening movement, its minor-mode Capriccio slow movement which runs on directly into the minuet, and a fugato finale alternating between light and serious moods.
The two Mozart Quartets are gems. The first is one of the six Haydn Quartets, all masterpieces of the literature. The two Prussian Quartets are less often performed, but both are gems. They date from the period of Mozart’s greatest compositional achievements: the three final symphonies, the operas Don Giovanni and Cosi fan tutte, the Clarinet Quintet, the G Minor and D Major String Quintets, and the heavenly B-Flat Major Piano Concert No. 27, Mozart’s finale in that format.
The performances by the Kuss Quartet provided the audience with proof of this ensembles well-earned praise from music critics worldwide, and why it has been awarded so many prizes in quartet competitions. Tempi were just right, phrasings perfect, bowing immaculate, and the playing overall heart-felt and fresh.
Enough can’t be said of the venue. The Music Room at Caramoor is just the type of setting that chamber artists and audiences dream about. It is not too large, not too tight, offers a smallish stage that does not dwarf the players, and has excellent acoustics. Add to that a rococo beauty of design and furnishings, and you have all that any music lover could wish for.
There are two remaining chamber concerts in this Caramoor Series: next Saturday, November 20th, at 8 P.M. with the Caramoor Virtuosi; and on Sunday, December 5th, at 4 P.M. with the Chamber Ensemble from the Orchestra of St. Luke’s.
Reviewed by Bill Breakstone
The Berlin-based Kuss Quartet appeared at Caramoor on Sunday afternoon, November 14th. I had not previously attended a concert by this ensemble, nor had I even heard of the group except when I read the promotional material mailed me by Caramoor. The four instrumentalists hail from different countries in Europe: first violinist Jana Kuss and second violinist Oliver Willie reside in Berlin; violist William Coleman hails from England; and cellist Mikayel Hakhnazaryan is from Albania.
The program offered one of Haydn’s Op. 20 quartets, and two mature quartets by Mozart, the B-Flat Major “Hunt Quartet,” K. 458 and the D Major 1st Prussian Quartet, K. 575. This was a delectable trio of quartets, to be sure.
Haydn’s set of six Op. 20 quartets were composed around 1770; the exact dates on many of Haydn’s works are hard to pinpoint. They are not as often performed as his more mature quartets of Op. 71, 74, 76 and 77. But they are nonetheless fascinating examples of one of the great quartet composers of all ages, indeed the inventor of the form. They date from the composer’s Sturm und Drang period, and established the four-movement format that Haydn and Mozart would use from then on; Beethoven, too, used the four-movement outline up until his late quartets. The outer movements were generally of moderate to fast pace; the inner two movements consisted of an adagio and a minuet. Haydn’s biographer Tovey wrote of the C Major, No. 2 that “it a new degree of cyclic integration with its luxuriantly scored opening movement, its minor-mode Capriccio slow movement which runs on directly into the minuet, and a fugato finale alternating between light and serious moods.
The two Mozart Quartets are gems. The first is one of the six Haydn Quartets, all masterpieces of the literature. The two Prussian Quartets are less often performed, but both are gems. They date from the period of Mozart’s greatest compositional achievements: the three final symphonies, the operas Don Giovanni and Cosi fan tutte, the Clarinet Quintet, the G Minor and D Major String Quintets, and the heavenly B-Flat Major Piano Concert No. 27, Mozart’s finale in that format.
The performances by the Kuss Quartet provided the audience with proof of this ensembles well-earned praise from music critics worldwide, and why it has been awarded so many prizes in quartet competitions. Tempi were just right, phrasings perfect, bowing immaculate, and the playing overall heart-felt and fresh.
Enough can’t be said of the venue. The Music Room at Caramoor is just the type of setting that chamber artists and audiences dream about. It is not too large, not too tight, offers a smallish stage that does not dwarf the players, and has excellent acoustics. Add to that a rococo beauty of design and furnishings, and you have all that any music lover could wish for.
There are two remaining chamber concerts in this Caramoor Series: next Saturday, November 20th, at 8 P.M. with the Caramoor Virtuosi; and on Sunday, December 5th, at 4 P.M. with the Chamber Ensemble from the Orchestra of St. Luke’s.
Sunday, November 14, 2010
WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?
By Bill Breakstone, November 14, 2010
It’s extremely difficult for me to read the papers and watch the news these days without becoming very depressed. This morning’s New York Times “Week in Review” section is a good example. Being the insomniac that I am, I spent a few hours in the middle of the night pondering what’s become of our Nation, and drafted some thoughts, some of which were reinforced by several columns in the Times.
America today is a country in dire straits. The political arena is paralyzed by partisanship, not only between the parties, but also within the parties. Economically, we are as close to a dead end as anyone savvy with finance could attest to. On the fiscal side, the paralysis mentioned above precludes any action. On the monetary side, the Federal Reserve is doing its best, but that quiver of arrows is just about empty, and even Fed Chair Bernanke admits that they are treading on untested waters. Most economists will admit the Nation faces a triad of dangers: deflation; prolonged joblessness; and a Japanese-like “lost decade,” marked by sluggish growth.
This past week, the Deficit Commission co-chairs released their initial recommendations. Though they contain significant proposals, and should be debated by the full Commission, most seem politically unacceptable, and are drawing fire from all fronts. David Leonhardt’s excellent Times piece contains the following points
“The looming federal deficits are so large that they are likely to occupy much of Washington’s attention for years. Arguably, this new deficit obsession — what some are calling the Age of Austerity — began this month. The midterm elections ushered in a Republican House majority pledging to shrink government, and on Wednesday the leaders of the bipartisan panel released the outline of a deficit-cutting plan for the panel’s members to debate.”
“As a starting point, it is worth thinking about the deficit as being two different deficits. The first is the medium-term deficit, which was created by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the 2003 Medicare drug plan, the Bush tax cuts, the recession and the government’s responses, like the stimulus.”
“The medium-term deficit does not appear to pose a huge threat to the American economy. Maya MacGuinea of the New America Foundation points out that simply letting all of the Bush tax cuts expire, not just those benefiting the affluent, would nearly do the job.”
“The long-term deficit is a wholly different beast.”
“It comes from the projected growth of Medicare, Medicaid and, to a lesser extent, Social Security. It is the result of baby boomers’ having paid far less in taxes than they will draw in benefits. “The reason we find ourselves in this situation,” said Mr. Bowles, the former chief of staff for President Bill Clinton, “is that we’ve made promises we can’t keep.”
“The solution will have to revolve around tax increases and changes to health care and Social Security. And the country cannot wait until 2030 to implement most of the changes, notes Alan Auerbach, an economics professor at the University of California at Berkeley. If it did, the interest on the national debt could become crushingly large. Deficit cutting will probably be a regular part of politics for the next couple of decades.”
“One obvious debate will be taxes versus spending. But relying exclusively on one would be extremely difficult. An approach based only on spending would mean deep cuts to programs that many Americans consider to be the essence of government: Medicare, Social Security and the military, among others. Closing the entire deficit through taxes would require enormous tax increases, mostly because Medicare spending is expected to continue growing much faster than income. To keep up, tax rates would have to keep rising.”
“The real issues, then, are how much taxes should rise, how much spending should be cut — and what kinds of each change should take place.”
“No matter what you pick, keep in mind the potential effects on economic growth. Arguably, economic growth is the most important yardstick for any plan, because growth can do much to reduce the deficit, as it did after World War II and in the 1990s.”
“No matter what you pick, keep in mind the potential effects on economic growth. Arguably, economic growth is the most important yardstick for any plan, because growth can do much to reduce the deficit, as it did after World War II and in the 1990s.”
“This helps explain why many economists favor a version of tax reform that would lower marginal rates and close loopholes. Ordinary tax cuts have a mixed record on helping the economy; growth after the Bush tax cuts was mediocre, for example. But tax reform could save households and businesses from changing their behavior, often inefficiently, to qualify for tax breaks. The Bowles-Simpson plan suggests several reforms that would raise more tax revenue than today’s code and help close the deficit.”
“Of course, when economists say loopholes, they are including the deduction on home mortgage interest and other popular items. That’s the problem with deficit cutting: it involves painful choices, like the ones you see here and the ones in the Bowles-Simpson plan that led to last week’s outcries.”
“The government has not yet solved the deficit problem, the economist William Gale of the Brookings Institution says, because voters have not yet demanded it. They have rewarded politicians who say they are worried about the budget much more than politicians willing to make specific benefit cuts and tax increases. All of us would prefer generous benefits and low taxes.”
“ ‘Whatever the eventual solution is,’ Mr. Gale said, ‘it will probably be something that is not politically feasible now.’ ”
However, let’s hypothesize that somehow our legislators will be able to reach a compromise in the new Congress, and implement some of the Commission’s proposals. They would be a mixture of spending cuts, including entitlement programs, tax increases, and tax reform. Would we then witness the types of civil unrest we have seen happening in France, Spain, Portugal, and, now, Great Britain?
In my mind, America is too great a country to continue to flounder in this seemingly hopeless morass. History is on our side. We have faced great challenges before and overcome them. Generations of Americans have risen to the challenges we have faced over the centuries, from the Civil War to World War I to World War II, and from the numerous financial panics that have occurred from 1819 until today
It is time to start thinking “outside the box.”
American Society at present is fractured. Disparate elements are at each other’s throats, all claiming that their way is the best way, the only way. What is needed is a unifying force that will bring the Nation back together. What could that be?
The fact is that society reacts best to emergencies—an outside threat to our national security; or an internal threat to civil stability, such as the Great Depression, the civil rights movement with its resulting riots, or the Great Recession that we are now enduring. Do things have to get to the panic stage before the Nation embarks on the proper course?
What America faced after the Depression is analogous to our challenges today. Both the European Union countries and the American right are not heeding the lessons that should have been learned from the experience of the 1930s. When leadership then turned from stimulus to deficit reduction, the Nation was plunged back into economic distress. Are we about to do the same thing now? The only thing that saved us then was World War II. If the only rallying point to unify the Nation is war or extreme civil unrest, what are the practical alternatives?
If one solution is indeed war,what is going to be our next battleground? The answer that David Broder posed in a recent Washington Post op-ed was Iran, and the justification will be that country’s refusal to take the military use of its nuclear capability off the table, and the threat that position poses to Mideast peace and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorist groups. But if the United States is going to engage Iran militarily, it must first exit Iraq and Afghanistan completely. Such an exit would be exceedingly simple to justify, as neither of those allies is living up to a standard of cooperation that encourages our further involvement.
If the triggering mechanism is not war, but civil unrest, it will come in the form of the American middle class taking to the streets in riots over the elimination of safety nets for the vast majority of average citizens, and cutbacks in Social Security and Medicare for our seniors. Would such a reaction prompt the leadership of both political factions to unite?
Here is another question. It has been fifty-eight years since America turned to a military leader, in the person of Dwight D. Eisenhower, to lead the Nation in a time of trouble. Has such a time now returned?
It’s extremely difficult for me to read the papers and watch the news these days without becoming very depressed. This morning’s New York Times “Week in Review” section is a good example. Being the insomniac that I am, I spent a few hours in the middle of the night pondering what’s become of our Nation, and drafted some thoughts, some of which were reinforced by several columns in the Times.
America today is a country in dire straits. The political arena is paralyzed by partisanship, not only between the parties, but also within the parties. Economically, we are as close to a dead end as anyone savvy with finance could attest to. On the fiscal side, the paralysis mentioned above precludes any action. On the monetary side, the Federal Reserve is doing its best, but that quiver of arrows is just about empty, and even Fed Chair Bernanke admits that they are treading on untested waters. Most economists will admit the Nation faces a triad of dangers: deflation; prolonged joblessness; and a Japanese-like “lost decade,” marked by sluggish growth.
This past week, the Deficit Commission co-chairs released their initial recommendations. Though they contain significant proposals, and should be debated by the full Commission, most seem politically unacceptable, and are drawing fire from all fronts. David Leonhardt’s excellent Times piece contains the following points
“The looming federal deficits are so large that they are likely to occupy much of Washington’s attention for years. Arguably, this new deficit obsession — what some are calling the Age of Austerity — began this month. The midterm elections ushered in a Republican House majority pledging to shrink government, and on Wednesday the leaders of the bipartisan panel released the outline of a deficit-cutting plan for the panel’s members to debate.”
“As a starting point, it is worth thinking about the deficit as being two different deficits. The first is the medium-term deficit, which was created by the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the 2003 Medicare drug plan, the Bush tax cuts, the recession and the government’s responses, like the stimulus.”
“The medium-term deficit does not appear to pose a huge threat to the American economy. Maya MacGuinea of the New America Foundation points out that simply letting all of the Bush tax cuts expire, not just those benefiting the affluent, would nearly do the job.”
“The long-term deficit is a wholly different beast.”
“It comes from the projected growth of Medicare, Medicaid and, to a lesser extent, Social Security. It is the result of baby boomers’ having paid far less in taxes than they will draw in benefits. “The reason we find ourselves in this situation,” said Mr. Bowles, the former chief of staff for President Bill Clinton, “is that we’ve made promises we can’t keep.”
“The solution will have to revolve around tax increases and changes to health care and Social Security. And the country cannot wait until 2030 to implement most of the changes, notes Alan Auerbach, an economics professor at the University of California at Berkeley. If it did, the interest on the national debt could become crushingly large. Deficit cutting will probably be a regular part of politics for the next couple of decades.”
“One obvious debate will be taxes versus spending. But relying exclusively on one would be extremely difficult. An approach based only on spending would mean deep cuts to programs that many Americans consider to be the essence of government: Medicare, Social Security and the military, among others. Closing the entire deficit through taxes would require enormous tax increases, mostly because Medicare spending is expected to continue growing much faster than income. To keep up, tax rates would have to keep rising.”
“The real issues, then, are how much taxes should rise, how much spending should be cut — and what kinds of each change should take place.”
“No matter what you pick, keep in mind the potential effects on economic growth. Arguably, economic growth is the most important yardstick for any plan, because growth can do much to reduce the deficit, as it did after World War II and in the 1990s.”
“No matter what you pick, keep in mind the potential effects on economic growth. Arguably, economic growth is the most important yardstick for any plan, because growth can do much to reduce the deficit, as it did after World War II and in the 1990s.”
“This helps explain why many economists favor a version of tax reform that would lower marginal rates and close loopholes. Ordinary tax cuts have a mixed record on helping the economy; growth after the Bush tax cuts was mediocre, for example. But tax reform could save households and businesses from changing their behavior, often inefficiently, to qualify for tax breaks. The Bowles-Simpson plan suggests several reforms that would raise more tax revenue than today’s code and help close the deficit.”
“Of course, when economists say loopholes, they are including the deduction on home mortgage interest and other popular items. That’s the problem with deficit cutting: it involves painful choices, like the ones you see here and the ones in the Bowles-Simpson plan that led to last week’s outcries.”
“The government has not yet solved the deficit problem, the economist William Gale of the Brookings Institution says, because voters have not yet demanded it. They have rewarded politicians who say they are worried about the budget much more than politicians willing to make specific benefit cuts and tax increases. All of us would prefer generous benefits and low taxes.”
“ ‘Whatever the eventual solution is,’ Mr. Gale said, ‘it will probably be something that is not politically feasible now.’ ”
However, let’s hypothesize that somehow our legislators will be able to reach a compromise in the new Congress, and implement some of the Commission’s proposals. They would be a mixture of spending cuts, including entitlement programs, tax increases, and tax reform. Would we then witness the types of civil unrest we have seen happening in France, Spain, Portugal, and, now, Great Britain?
In my mind, America is too great a country to continue to flounder in this seemingly hopeless morass. History is on our side. We have faced great challenges before and overcome them. Generations of Americans have risen to the challenges we have faced over the centuries, from the Civil War to World War I to World War II, and from the numerous financial panics that have occurred from 1819 until today
It is time to start thinking “outside the box.”
American Society at present is fractured. Disparate elements are at each other’s throats, all claiming that their way is the best way, the only way. What is needed is a unifying force that will bring the Nation back together. What could that be?
The fact is that society reacts best to emergencies—an outside threat to our national security; or an internal threat to civil stability, such as the Great Depression, the civil rights movement with its resulting riots, or the Great Recession that we are now enduring. Do things have to get to the panic stage before the Nation embarks on the proper course?
What America faced after the Depression is analogous to our challenges today. Both the European Union countries and the American right are not heeding the lessons that should have been learned from the experience of the 1930s. When leadership then turned from stimulus to deficit reduction, the Nation was plunged back into economic distress. Are we about to do the same thing now? The only thing that saved us then was World War II. If the only rallying point to unify the Nation is war or extreme civil unrest, what are the practical alternatives?
If one solution is indeed war,what is going to be our next battleground? The answer that David Broder posed in a recent Washington Post op-ed was Iran, and the justification will be that country’s refusal to take the military use of its nuclear capability off the table, and the threat that position poses to Mideast peace and the proliferation of nuclear weapons to terrorist groups. But if the United States is going to engage Iran militarily, it must first exit Iraq and Afghanistan completely. Such an exit would be exceedingly simple to justify, as neither of those allies is living up to a standard of cooperation that encourages our further involvement.
If the triggering mechanism is not war, but civil unrest, it will come in the form of the American middle class taking to the streets in riots over the elimination of safety nets for the vast majority of average citizens, and cutbacks in Social Security and Medicare for our seniors. Would such a reaction prompt the leadership of both political factions to unite?
Here is another question. It has been fifty-eight years since America turned to a military leader, in the person of Dwight D. Eisenhower, to lead the Nation in a time of trouble. Has such a time now returned?
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