BOOK REVIEW--"OBAMA'S WAR" by BOB WOODWARD

Reviewed by Bill Breakstone, November 28, 2010

When Bob Woodward’s latest book, “Obama’s Wars,” was released for publication some six weeks ago, it was lavishly promoted with personal appearances by the author on just about every single talk show, and also accorded notoriety by some striking revelations of a personal nature of aides within both White House and Pentagon circles. I put off reading the volume as it seemed the critics and talking heads had more than amply covered its contents. I was wrong!

“Obama’s Wars” is a fascinatingly detailed account of the new president’s assumption of the Afghanistan Crisis, starting during his briefings by the Bush White House and Pentagon staff once he became a presidential candidate, through his election, inauguration, and the first 18 months of his presidency. It may be Woodward’s finest effort, though many will find the complexity of the decision-making process to be staggering. But if you’re a foreign policy buff, or just want to really understand why the Afghan War is such a frustrating challenge for policy makers, this book is for you.

On the day Obama was elected, there were 150,000 American troops in Iraq, and 38,000 in Afghanistan. One of Obama’s campaign pledges was to turn the focus from Iraq and deal with where the Islamic terrorists, both the Taliban and al Qaeda, were active, meaning Afghanistan, AND Pakistan.

The policy headache started on November 26, 2008, and it would become a migraine of the worst order. On that date, President Bush met with Gen. Douglas Lute, the war czar, for one of his last National Security Council Meetings. Lute had conducted a thorough review of the Afghan War, and the results were grim. We were headed toward failure, plain and simple. He pinpointed three reasons: (1) Afghan governance was totally inadequate; (2) the opium trade was out of control, with its resulting corruption of public officials; (3) Pakistan was harboring the Taliban, and their intelligence agency was supporting them—without Pakistan’s determination to act as our ally in rooting out al Qaeda and the Taliban, the chance of success in Afghanistan would be futile.

Thus began a 13-month policy review by the new administration and their military staff at the Pentagon and “in country.” Obama was determined to “get it right,” no matter what it would take. He proceeded in a deliberate fashion, listened to the advice of his Pentagon chiefs and his national security team, sorted through the options presented, changed his commanders in the field, fought the military tooth-in-nail, and finally, in December of 2009, endorsed a plan which was signed off on by everyone, then presented in a speech at West Point.

An additional 30,000 troops, four combat brigades would be authorized, but only three sent immediately. The option of deploying the fourth brigade would be made in December of 2010. As an added caveat to the Pentagon, it was agreed that should circumstances warrant it, and additional 10%, or 3,000 additional troops, may also be deployed. Troop presence would build until July of 2011, when a drawdown would begin, depending upon the situation on the ground.

Reports coming back from Afghanistan during the winter of 2009—2010 were discouraging, to say the least. The plan was not working. The Taliban were operating freely in almost all areas of the country. Troop training was inadequate; not even one company of American soldiers could turn over responsibility to the Afghan Army and Police. The Afghan government did not have the support of the population. Pakistan spoke highly of a joint effort, but refused to act in any meaningful way. Changes had to be made.

Things came to a head in May and June of 20010. Intelligence Director Admiral Dennis Blair was fired on May 20th. The ground commander, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was fired and replaced by Gen. David Petraeus on June 23rd.; the final manpower shoe dropped on October 8, 2010, when National Security Advisor Gen. James L. Jones (Ret.) announced his resignation, to be replaced by Thomas E. Donilon.

Woodward completed his book in late July of 2010, and since that time, the Afghan Crisis continues to be in a state of flux. The December Review is due any week now, and it does not appear that conditions on the ground have improved in any meaningful way. Will the fourth combat brigade be deployed? Will the timetable for beginning the troop drawdown be extended? Will Special Forces and CIA forces be deployed on the ground in Pakistan? That will never be announced publically; it will be a totally covert operation.

Woodward doesn’t draw any conclusions; he and his staff just state the facts and leave future policy to the decision makers. But the reader can surmise certain options:

(1) Afghanistan is unwinnable! Al Qaeda is not there. They are in Pakistan. The Kabul government is a fraud, led by an unstable, manic-depressive who is on and off medications and subject to wild mood swings, states of paranoia, corrupt, and without the support of his people. Why did the Russians finally give up? They realized it was hopeless. Do we need to follow their example?
(2) The focus must be where al Qaeda is, and the Taliban, and that is in Pakistan. Action must be taken there. Woodward reports that such a possibility has indeed been discussed among high administration officials, but no decision has been forthcoming. The option is to tell the Pakistanis that either they will root out the extremists or we will.
(3) We have witnessed in the past 18 months numerous attempts by terrorists to inflict severe damage on our homeland. Thus far, we have dodged the bullet through a combination of intelligence gathering and sheer luck. But it’s like playing Russian roulette. Sooner or later, a bullet will be in the chamber. When the catastrophe happens, options will be taken out of the administration’s hands.
(4) Additional efforts should be directed to other al Qaeda training centers and bases being harbored elsewhere in the world, noticeably in Yemen and Somalia.

Woodward begins “Obama’s Wars” with a personal note of thanks to two of his staffers. These are his words:

“I had two of the most exceptional people assist me full-time on the reporting, writing, editing and thinking about this book: Josh Boak, a 2001 cum laude graduate of Princeton and later of the Columbia University master’s program in journalism. . . . Josh immersed himself in all the details and nuances of the Afghanistan War, the Obama administration and Washington politics. He became part of my brain—the better part. . . . there would be no book without him—not even close; Evelyn M. Duffy, who worked with me on “The War Within: A Secret White House History, 2006—2008, continued on this project. Thank God. At age 25, she is a wizard at everything.”

Thanks to Woodward and his young staffers, “Obama’s War” is a classic analysis of national decision-making and the awful conflict that will no doubt tear this Nation apart for the foreseeable future.